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We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, 
and the reasons and incentives why a pirate would want to be a leader in prices. The 
framework of analysis used is a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with 
price competition, where both incumbent and pirate are committed to keep their prices. 
We find that both government and incumbent have a key role in avoiding the entry of 
the pirate. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a 
monopolist, even if he installs an antipiracy system, because a monopoly provides the 
lowest social welfare. However, he will let the pirate enters as a follower or as a leader, or 
encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of the pirate, which depends on the 
technology of the government for monitoring piracy. The pirate decides to become a 
leader to avoid being brought down by the incumbent and the government, although 
the leader's profit is lower than the follower's profit. Finally, we find that high-income 
countries with cheaper monitoring technology have lower piracy rates. 
 
JEL classification: K42; L13; L86 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the past few years, most digital products have frequently been illegally copied and sold, to the point
w h e r ei ti sp o s s i b l et oﬁnd a new product pirated before it is oﬃcially launched on the market. We point
out two news items taken from Spanish newspaper EL PAIS: “New García Márquez Novel Pirated In
Colombia Before Its Presentation”(2004b) and, “Pirated Version Of Xbox’s Star Game For Christmas
Appears On Internet”(2004a).
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fp i r a c yi sr e ﬂected in the studies of piracy, which show that levels of piracy rates
are high but vary across regions. In particular, the 2005 Global Software Piracy Study reveals that piracy
rates in 2004 were 22% in North America, 35% in the European Union, 61% in the Eastern Europe and
66% in Latin America. The diﬀerences between individual countries are even bigger. The piracy rate in
2004 was 21% in the United States, 23% in New Zealand, 91% in Ukraine and 92% in Vietnam. These
studies also show the industry losses from piracy by region, highlighting the large losses in North America
and European Union because markets there are so large, even though these regions had relatively low
piracy rates. According to the 2005 Global Software Piracy Study, losses in 2004 (expressed in millions
of dollars) totalled 1546 in Latin America, 2313 in Eastern Europe, 7549 in North America and 12151 in
the EU.
In this study and others, the industry losses are represented by the value of pirated software at original
prices. This approach implicitly assumes that legal and pirated copies are perfect substitutes, which would
imply that, if the purchase of an illegal copy were not available, this would imply the purchase of an
original product, i.e. piracy has a negative impact on sales of digital products.
Moreover, there are contradictory verdicts from diﬀerent courts in this regard. In particular, one of
the reasons why the courts ruled that Napster harmed the music industry was the loss of sales of CDs
(see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2005)). However, a judge in Alicante (Spain) ruled that commercial piracy
harmed neither intellectual property nor the record company’s sales of CDs and DVDs (see ruling JUR
2005\240478).
There are many empirical academic studies that seek the relationship between software piracy and
consumer income. For example, Marron and Steel (2000) and Rodríguez-Andrés (2006) ﬁnd that high-
income countries have lower piracy rates. Bezmen and Depken II (2006), ﬁnds a negative relationship
between software piracy and income for various states in the United States.
Piracy has previously been analyzed from a theoretical viewpoint. Some papers have focused on the
case of copies made exclusively by end consumers (Johnson (1985), Shy and Thisse (1999) and Bae and
Choi (2006)),1 and others on cases of copies made by a single ﬁrm that sells them on the market (Banerjee
(2003) and Poddar (2003)). Johnson (1985) supports traditional common wisdom, i.e. that consumers’
surplus and social surplus can fall as revenue losses induced by copying reduce the number of creative
works, and that this is more likely the greater the supply elasticity and the greater the value consumers
1See Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) for a survey of piracy in which copies are made exclusively by end consumers.
2place on product variety. Nevertheless, recent works question such traditional wisdom and maintain that
making creators extremely wealthy is a consequence that is welcome to them, but unnecessary to society
(Boldrin and Levine (2006)).
Our work is close to that of Banerjee (2003), who considers a monopolist selling original software
and a government monitoring and penalizing the pirate. However, that paper commits errors in solving
the model which we avoid here (see López-Cuñat and Martínez-Sánchez (2006)). In Banerjee (2003) the
incumbent does not consider correctly the consequences of the anticipated pirate’s decisions about entry,
in particular he does not take into account the setting deterred entry, according to the taxonomy of Bain
(1956).
In this paper, we develop a duopoly model of vertical product diﬀerentiation with price competition
to analyze the problem of entry of a pirate in the market, where it is possible that the pirate becomes
a leader in prices. We consider that the timing of the game is exogenous,2 where the pirate has the
advantage of deciding ﬁrst whether to enter or not, because the illegality of the pirate lets him a higher
ﬂexibility of movement than the incumbent. Thus, it is necessary that the leader (the incumbent or
the pirate) is committed to keep his price.3 The incumbent’s commitment is due to he want to keep his
reputation, but the pirate’s commitment is due to his illegal feature, which clear him of any responsibility.
We consider that the ﬁrms do not compete on quality because we focus on a short run analysis.
Thus, we assume that the cost incurred by the incumbent in developing a product is a sunk cost and the
production cost of both the incumbent and the pirate is zero, like Wauthy (1996) and Banerjee (2003), but
unlike Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993) and Crampes and Hollander (1995). Ronnen (1991) considers ﬁrms
face quality-dependent ﬁxed cost and compete on quality and price. He ﬁnds that even in the absence
of externalities an appropriately chosen standard improves social welfare. Nevertheless, Crampes and
Hollander (1995) shows that, when the quality-dependent cost is variable, consumers’ welfare increases
if the ﬁrm producing the higher quality does not increase its quality signiﬁcantly in response to increase
in quality by its rival. Motta (1993) considers both kinds of cost and shows that ﬁrms diﬀerentiate more
under Bertrand than under Cournot, and that social welfare is greater when ﬁrms compete on prices and
also when ﬁrms bear ﬁxed costs independently of the kind of competition.
Our analysis shows that monopoly provides the lowest social welfare level, so in equilibrium the
g o v e r n m e n tw i l ln o tm a k et h ee ﬀorts necessary to blockade the entry of the pirate, even if the incumbent
installs an antipiracy system. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, the government will decide to let the pirate
enter as a follower (f-outcome), to let the pirate become the leader in prices (l-outcome) or to encourage
the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the entry of the pirate (deterred entry or ne-
outcome), which depends on the technology of the government to monitor the piracy, which is represented
by the monitoring cost of piracy. These results are according to the taxonomy of Bain (1956).
2Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) studies duopoly games where the timing of the game is endogenous.
3From a theoretical viewpoint the leader (the incumbent or the pirate) is committed to keep his price because the leader’s
proﬁt is higher than Bertrand’s proﬁt, where Bertrand is the outcome when there is no commitment.
3Thus we show that the great variation in piracy rates from one country to another is a consequence of
diﬀerent technologies for monitoring piracy by governments. And we also ﬁnd that high-income countries
with cheaper monitoring technology have lower piracy rates.
An interesting result is that the government will never protect the incumbent fully but only partially.
This is because when there is no piracy, the incumbent abuses his dominant position since he sets high
prices, and the fact is that although the pirate is engaged in an illegal activity, he helps to moderate
the unfair behavior of the incumbent. In short, copyright owner’s eﬀorts to reduce piracy should focus
not only on the government enforcement but also on pricing strategies. This statement is empirically
supported by Papadopoulos (2003).
Finally, according this paper, the decrease of the sales of CDs is not a result of piracy, so industry
losses from piracy are lower that claimed by the industry itself, by most studies and by some court rulings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model formally. Section 3
considers market equilibrium. Section 4 considers the optimal policy. Section 5 analyzes and compares
the results of the model with those of the current theoretical and empirical literature. Section 6 extends
the model to the case where the incumbent has the opportunity to decide ﬁrst whether to enter or not.
Section 7 considers the possibility of the incumbent’s installing an antipiracy system. Finally, Section 8
concludes.
2 The model
We consider four types of agent: consumers, the developer of an original product (incumbent), a pi-
rate who illegally reproduces and sells it, and the government which is responsible for monitoring and
penalizing the pirate.




.4 θ is assumed to follow an uniform
distribution, and represents the consumers’ tastes for the quality of the product. Each consumer is
assumed to buy only one unit of the good or not to buy.





θqi − pi if the consumer buys the original product
θqp − pp if the consumer buys the pirated product
0 if the consumer does not buy
(1)
where pi, qi, pp and qp are the price and quality of the original and the pirated product, respectively.
We assume qi >q p > 0.
Let xi = pi/qi and xp = pp/qp be the incumbent’s and pirate’s hedonic prices, respectively. Since
qualities are common knowledge, decisions on prices are equivalent to decisions on hedonic prices. Let





4We consider that the market is uncovered, ie. there is always at least one consumer who does not buy at all.
4Firms’ demand functions are obtained as follows. Let θo be a consumer who is indiﬀerent between
buying the original and the pirated product. From (1), θo =( rxi − xp)/(r − 1). Let θi be a consumer
indiﬀerent between buying from the incumbent and not buying at all, that is, θi = xi.L e t θp be a
consumer indiﬀerent between buying from the pirate and not buying at all, that is, θp = xp.
The demands faced by the incumbent and the pirate are
Di (xi,x p)=
(














− θp if xi ≥ xp
(3)
We assume that consumers do not face the risk of prosecution for the use of copies because they
did not illegally copy and sell the original product.5 The government is responsible for monitoring and
penalizing the pirate. Let α and G be the monitoring rate and the penalty. Thus, α is the probability
of detecting the pirate. We assume 0 ≤ G ≤ G,w h e r eG is the maximum legal penalty. Let C(α) be the
cost of monitoring piracy. We assume C(0) = 0,C0(α) > 0.
We assume that a ﬁrm remains in the market if and only if it is making positive proﬁt. If the pirate’s
illegal operations are detected, which occurs with probability α,h em u s tp a yt h ep e n a l t yG and he loses
his income. So the expected proﬁts of the incumbent and the pirate, taking into account that detection
takes place after sale, are
πi(.)=qixiDi(xi,x p),π p(.)=( 1− α)qpxpDp(xi,x p) − αG. (4)
We consider that the cost incurred by the incumbent in developing an original product is a sunk
cost and the production costs of both the incumbent and the pirate are zero (as in Wauthy (1996) and
Banerjee (2003), but unlike Ronnen (1991), Motta (1993) and Crampes and Hollander (1995)).
Let αG + αδIp (xi,x p) − C(α) be the net expected revenue of the government, where Ip (xi,x p)=
qpxpDp(xi,x p) represents the pirate’s revenue and δ ∈ [0,1] represents the government’s ability to reuse
the revenue seized from the pirate. The government chooses α and G to maximize the social welfare,
which is the sum of the proﬁts both the incumbent and the pirate, the consumer surplus and the net
expected revenue of the government.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the complete information game is the following. The government announces
α and G to maximize social welfare, and both ﬁrms observe the policy variables. Then the pirate decides
whether to price ﬁrst or not. If he decides to price ﬁrst he becomes the leader on prices, so the incumbent
prices the original product taking into account the pirate’s price (l-subgame). But if the pirate decides
to wait, he becomes a follower on prices that decides whether to enter or not after the incumbent sets the
price of the original product (f-subgame).6 Finally, the consumers decide to buy the original product,
the pirated product or neither after they have observed ﬁrms’ prices.
5Which is true for the penal codes of most countries (e.g., see articles 270 to 272 of the Spanish penal code).




















Figure 1: The timing of the game
In the two next sections, we seek to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game by
backward induction. In the following section, we solve the f-subgame and the l-subgame. Next, we look
f o rt h ed e c i s i o no ft h ep i r a t eo nw h e t h e rt ob et h el e a d e r . I nS e c t i o n4 ,w el o o kf o rt h eg o v e r n m e n t ’ s
optimal policy (α,G) anticipating the equilibrium of the continuation game.
3 Market Equilibrium
3.1 F-subgame
In this subgame the pirate decides to wait, so he becomes a follower on prices. The pirate’s optimal
hedonic price, given the incumbent’s choice, is obtained by maximizing the pirate’s proﬁt. It is similar






xi/2 if 0 ≤ xi ≤
2θ(r−1)
2r−1
rxi − (r − 1)θ if
2θ(r−1)





2r ≤ xi ≤ θ
(5)
By substituting (5) in the pirate’s proﬁt, we obtain the pirate’s maximum proﬁt πc
p (xi)=( 1− α)qiγ (xi)−







4(r−1) if 0 ≤ xi ≤
2θ(r−1)
2r−1 ¡













2r ≤ xi ≤ θ
(6)
6The pirate decides to enter the market when πc
p (xi) > 0, i.e. when γ (xi) >g ,w h e r e
g =
αG
qi (1 − α)
, (7)
which is increasing in α and G, and indicates the government’s eﬀort to avoid piracy. Notice that
γ (xi) >gis equivalent to xi >x ne
i ,w h e r exne
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Therefore, the pirate’s optimal decision is to enter and price xBR
p (xi) if xi >x ne
i ; and to not enter if
xi ≤ xne
















i <x i ≤ θ
(9)
From maximizing the incumbent’s proﬁt in equation (9), we obtain the following values that are






























p is the pirate’s revenue when he is the follower. We ﬁnd that when the government makes little
eﬀort to combat piracy (g very low), the pirate enters as a follower and price xf
p, and when the government
makes a major eﬀort (g very high), the entry of the pirate is blockaded, so the incumbent becomes a
monopolist that prices at a monopoly price of xm
i . However, for intermediate levels of government eﬀort,
the incumbent ﬁnds optimal to set a low enough price (xne
i ) to avoid piracy. These results are summarized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In any SPE, the optimal strategies of the incumbent and the pirate are:
(a) The pirate will enter the market only if xi >x ne
i and will price according to (5).
(b) The incumbent will price x∗
i = x
f
i and the pirate will price x∗
p = xf








8(r − 1)(2r − 1)
. (11)
(c) The incumbent will price x∗
i = xne







4 if 1 <r≤ 3/2
θ
2
16(r−1) if 3/2 ≤ r.
(12)
7We assume xne
i is equal to +∞ when θ/4r<gfor convenience of analysis only. This means that the pirate is deterred
from entering for any price when the government’s eﬀort is very high.
7(d) The incumbent will price x∗
i = xm
i if gm ≤ g.
Proof: see Appendix A.
Notice that there is no piracy when gl ≤ g.W h e ngm ≤ g, piracy is only eliminated because of high
expenditure by the government in preventing it, so the incumbent can set a monopoly price. However,
when gl ≤ g<g m, government intervention must be accompanied by the incumbent setting a low enough
price, so the incumbent shares with the government the cost of eliminating piracy.
From equation (12) we get that the eﬀort by the government that leads to monopoly is decreasing in
r, which means that blockading the entry of the pirate is easier when the diﬀerentiation is higher.
3.2 L-subgame
T h el - s u b g a m ei sr e a c h e dw h e nt h ep i r a t ep r i c e sﬁrst and thus becomes the leader on prices. The
incumbent’s optimal hedonic price, given the pirate’s choice, is obtained by maximizing the incumbent’s







θ(r − 1) + xp
¢





2r−1 ≤ xp ≤ θ/2
θ/2 if θ/2 ≤ xp ≤ θ
(13)
The pirate incorporates the incumbent’s reaction function into his proﬁt function and chooses the






















p is the pirate’s revenue when he is the leader. Since the incumbent’s proﬁt is not negative he
always enters the market. Notice that the pirate’s proﬁta sl e a d e r( πl
p =( 1− α)Il
p − αG) is positive if
and only if g<I l
p/qi = g0.
3.3 Pirate: leader or follower
In this subsection we analyze the pirate’s optimal decision about when to enter the market. From results
obtained in each subgame, we get that if the pirate waits he anticipates proﬁto fπF
p =( 1−α)If
p −αG > 0
when g<g l,a n dπF
p =0when gl ≤ g. B u ti ft h ep i r a t ep r i c e sﬁrst he anticipates proﬁto fπL
p =
(1 − α)Il
p − αG,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ei fa n do n l yi fg<g 0.
Since gl <g 0, to obtain the pirate’s optimal decision we have to compare πF
p with πL
p in the three
regions given by g<g l, gl ≤ g<g 0,a n dg0 ≤ g.
For g<g l,w eh a v eπF
p =( 1−α)If
p −αG,a n dπL
p =( 1−α)Il
p−αG.S i n c eIf
p >I l
p, the pirate decides
to wait to price the copy until after the incumbent prices the original product.
For gl ≤ g<g 0,w eh a v eπF
p =0and πL
p > 0.S i n c eπL
p >π F
p , the pirate prices the copy before the
incumbent prices the original product.
8For g = g0,w eh a v eπF
p =0and πL
p =0 . To ensure the existence of an equilibrium it is necessary the
pirate becomes a follower that will later not enter.
For g0 <g ,w eh a v eπF
p =0and πL
p < 0. So the pirate decides to wait and becomes a follower that
will not enter the market.
As we can see, the pirate’s optimal decision, like the incumbent’s optimal decision, depends on the
level of expenditure by the government on avoiding piracy. When g<g l, the pirate waits until the
incumbent prices the original product since his proﬁti sh i g h e ra saf o l l o w e r .H o w e v e r ,w h e ngl ≤ g<g 0,
he prices ﬁrst because he anticipates a proﬁt of zero as a follower, since the incumbent deters him from
entering the market through prices, and a positive proﬁt as a leader, since when he prices ﬁrst he restricts
himself to force the incumbent to not deter him. The following proposition shows the outcomes that arise
as a result of pirate’s optimal decision:
Proposition 2 In any SPE,
(a) The pirate will wait and price the pirated product as a follower x∗
p = xf
p,w h e ng<g l.S o t h e




(b) The pirate will become the leader and price x∗
p = xl
p,w h e ngl ≤ g<g 0. So the incumbent becomes
the follower and prices x∗
i = xl
i.
(c) The pirate becomes a follower that will later not enter, when g0 ≤ g. So the incumbent becomes a
monopolist that prices x∗
i = xne
i when g0 ≤ g<g m,a n dx∗
i = xm
i when gm ≤ g.
The government’s optimal policy is analyzed in the next section.
4 Optimal Policy: analysis of social welfare
The government chooses the optimal policy that maximizes social welfare anticipating the equilibrium
of the continuation game. Social welfare is the sum of the proﬁts of the incumbent and the pirate, the
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p − α(1 − δ)If
p − C (α) if 0 ≤ g<g l,
CSl + πl
i + Il
p − α(1 − δ)Il
p − C (α) if gl ≤ g<g 0,
CSne + πne
i − C (α) if g0 ≤ g<g m,
CSm + πm
i − C (α) if gm ≤ g
(15)
where CSk is the consumer’s surplus in the four outcomes k ∈ {f,l,ne,m} listed in the previous




(θqp − pp)dθ +
Z θ
θo




8(2r−1)2 ; CSl =
qiθ
2(16r3+12r2−15r+3)








Given that a higher monitoring rate entails a higher cost, α ≡
qigl
qigl+G is decreasing in G and a higher
penalty does not entail a higher cost, the government will choose the maximum penalty, which is G.
Notice that social welfare is decreasing in α on the intervals [0,g l),[gl,g 0),[g0,g m) and [gm,+∞),s i n c e
(i) the values CSk,πk
i ,Ik










is decreasing in g because xne
i is increasing in g and g ≡ αG/qi (1 − α) is increasing in α; and (iii) the
monitoring cost of piracy is increasing, C0 (α) > 0. So in order to maximize social welfare the government
will choose the minimum monitoring rate that lead to diﬀerent outcomes, which is α ∈ {αf,α l,α ne,α m},




qig0+G and αm =
qigm
qigm+G. As a result, since g is increasing in α,s o c i a l
welfare is decreasing in g,s ot h ev a l u eo fg in the social maximum is reached in {0,g l,g 0,g m}.S i n c e
0 <g l <g 0 <g m,w eh a v eαf <α l <α ne <α m.
The maximum social welfare is obtained from comparing the following values:




Wl = CSl + πl
i + Il
p − αl (1 − δ)Il




i0 − C (αne),
Wm = CSm + πm





0 are the hedonic price, the incumbent’s proﬁt and the consumer’s surplus at





















Let c Wk = CSk + πk
i + Ik
p be the gross social welfare in outcomes k ∈ {f,l,ne,m}.L e t ∆c Wx
y =
c Wx − c Wy be the gain in gross social welfare that outcome x generates as regards outcome y.L e t
Cl = C (αl)+( 1− δ)αlIl
p be the social cost that the government supports when the pirate is a leader
(l-outcome), where the ﬁrst term is the cost of monitoring piracy and the second is the expected money
loss of the revenue seized from the pirate. For simplicity we call Cne = C (αne). The value of the gross




8(2r−1)2 ; c Wl =
θ
2qi(48r3−28r2−9r+5)








c Wm < c Wf < c Wl < c Wne
0 (21)
From (21) and given that C0 (α) > 0, we deduce that the monopoly (with no restriction in prices)
provides the lowest social welfare due to excessive power of the incumbent in the market. Thus, the
government never chooses αm, and the monopoly is not part of the equilibrium.
As can be seen from Figure 2 and the following proposition, the outcome that maximizes social










l ne l W C C ˆ ∆ − =
l
f W ˆ ∆
ne
f W ˆ ∆
Figure 2: The Government’s optimal policy
every outcome. In particular: encouraging the incumbent to set a low enough price for the pirate not
to enter the market maximizes the social welfare if the cost of monitoring piracy at this outcome is low
enough as regards the sum of the gain of gross social welfare that it generates and the cost of monitoring
piracy at the other outcomes (f-a n dl-outcomes); letting the pirate be the leader maximizes the social
welfare if the cost of monitoring piracy at this outcome is low enough as regards the sum of the gain of
gross social welfare that it generates and the cost of monitoring piracy at the other outcomes (f-a n d
ne-outcome); and otherwise, letting the pirate enter as a follower maximizes the social welfare, i.e. when
the cost of monitoring piracy at l-a n dne- o u t c o m e si sh i g h .
Proposition 3 In any SPE, the optimal strategy of the government is:
(a) g =0 ,i fCne > ∆c Wne
f and Cl > ∆c Wl
f.
(b) g = gl,i fCne >C l + ∆c Wne
l and Cl < ∆c Wl
f.
(c) g = g0,i fCne < ∆c Wne
f and Cne <C l + ∆c Wne
l .
To obtain that the l-outcome is a social maximum it is necessary that the government’s ability to
reuse the revenue seized from the pirate is high enough (i.e. δ is high enough). This is because the social
welfare when the pirate is a follower can be greater than when he is the leader on prices, independently
of the value of cost of monitoring piracy. Which happens when c Wl − αl (1 − δ)Il
p < c Wf, because the
government can reuse little of the revenue seized from the pirate. In this case the maximum social
welfare will be letting the pirate enter as a follower or deterring him from entering, which depends on the
monitoring cost Cne: for a low enough Cne, deterring entry by the pirate is socially optimal, otherwise
the social optimum choice is to let the pirate enter as a follower.
As a numerical example, we illustrate the government’s optimal policy when qi =2 , qp =1 , θ =1
and δ =1 .I n t h i s c a s e , w e h a v e r =2 , c Wf =0 .8611, c Wl =0 .8993, c Wne =0 .9167 and c Wm =0 .75.
When C (αl)=0 .069 and C (αne)=0 .07, social welfare in each outcome is Wf =0 .8611, Wl =0 .8303
11and Wne =0 .8467, so the government decides g =0 .B u tw h e nC (αl)=0 .01 and C (αne)=0 .05,s o c i a l
welfare in each outcome is Wf =0 .8611, Wl =0 .8893 and Wne =0 .8667, so the government decides
g = gl.A n dw h e nC (αl)=0 .049 and C (αne)=0 .05, social welfare in each outcome is Wf =0 .8611,
Wl =0 .8503 and Wne =0 .8667, so the government decides g = g0.





i ,8 which means that the incumbent sets lowest price in ne-
outcome. This fact and the fact that gross social welfare in ne-outcome is highest (see relationship (21))
help to explain why, when the monitoring cost is low enough, the government would rather have only the
incumbent producing and selling the product at its lowest price than have the product sold in diﬀerent
qualities and at diﬀerent prices by the incumbent and the pirate.
Notice that the government incurs a budgetary deﬁcit to reach the outcome where the incumbent
deters the entry of the pirate through prices. This deﬁcit comes about because the government incurs a
monitoring cost and does not obtain revenue because the pirate does not enter the market. This result
suggests it is sometimes necessary incurs a budgetary deﬁcit to reach the socially optimum outcome,
which is not took into account by Banerjee (2003) because he assumes the budget is balanced.
So far we have included the pirate’s proﬁt in social welfare because he is an agent that generates
revenue and helps to moderate the incumbent’s abuse of his dominant position.9 However, we may
decide not to include the pirate on ethical and moral grounds. In that case, the results obtained in this
section are held if the marginal monitoring cost of piracy is high enough as regards the maximum penalty
and the revenue used from the revenue seized from the pirate. See Appendix C for more details.
5 Analysis of equilibrium
5.1 Analysis of demands
























From (23), it can be observed that original product sales do not decrease due to the threat of piracy,
as per Shy and Thisse (1999), Banerjee (2003) and Bae and Choi (2006). But, unlike Shy and Thisse
(1999), we do not assume network eﬀects between the original and the pirated product. Thus, according
to the model developed in this paper, if the purchase of an illegal copy at a lower price were not available,
8This result is compatible with those of Mussa and Rosen (1978), where the monopoly price is higher than the competitive
price.
9We consider that the incumbent abuses his dominant position because he produces a speciﬁcp r o d u c ta n ds e t sh i g h
prices.
12this would not imply the purchase of an original product at a higher price. This is because of the eﬀect of
the threat of piracy on the incumbent’s pricing behavior, the fact that the copy is lower in quality than
the original product and the market is uncovered (i.e. there is always at least one consumer who does not
buy at all). This result contrasts with most studies about piracy and some court rulings, which assume
that the copies sold by the pirate are equivalent to units of products that the incumbent does not sell.
But, this one is compatible with the results in Johnson (1985), where copying reduces sales of the original
product in spite of the incumbent’s pricing behavior. This is because Johnson (1985) assumes that the
quality of the copy is the same as the original product and the market is covered (i.e. all consumers buy
either the original and the pirated product).
Notice that the demand of the leader, whether it is the incumbent or the pirate, does not depend on
the quality of the products, and the total amount of products sold by both on the market when the pirate
enters (Di+Dp) is the same, both when he is a leader and when he is a follower. We obtain that both the
incumbent and the pirate prefer to be the follower rather than the leader on prices, as in the models of
price competition with imperfect substituted products (2004). Moreover, like Shaked and Sutton (1982),
we obtain that the top quality ﬁrm (incumbent) enjoys greater revenue than its rival (pirate). We also
obtain that the pirate establishes the same price whether he is the leader or the follower.
5.2 Measure of competition
A measure of price competition is obtained by taking the ratio of prices, as in Moraga-González and
Viaene (2005). From (10-14-24) we deduce that an increase in the quality ratio relaxes price competition

























It is clear from (24) that the ratio of hedonic prices is constant in the f-subgame and increasing in the
l-subgame. This is because the pirate, as a follower, always prices at half the incumbent’s price, and as
a leader he cannot do this because the ﬁnal decision lies with the incumbent.
5.3 Comparative static
We now analyze the eﬀects of an increase in product quality taking into account that the government’s
optimal policy does not change. The results obtained is summarizes in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In any SPE, we have that:
(a) An increase in qi leads to higher prices and revenue for both incumbent and pirate, although it leads
to lower demand to the follower, whether it is the incumbent or the pirate.
(b) The eﬀect of qp is opposite to qi, although the eﬀect on the price and revenue of the pirate depend
on the initial level of diﬀerentiation, independently whether he is the leader or the follower. In
particular, it is positive for an initial high diﬀerentiation, otherwise it is negative.
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Figure 3: The social optimum
(c) SWf increases in qi and qp.
Proof: see Appendix B.
A bigger diﬀerentiation leads to greater market power for both the incumbent and the pirate, inde-
pendently who is the leader, enabling them to set higher prices and obtain more revenue.10 An increase
in the quality of the pirate induces the incumbent in the outcomes f, l and ne to reduce the price of the
original product, and the pirate, as a follower or leader, to rise the price of the pirated product for a high
initial diﬀerentiation. This is because a rise in qp implies an increase in the value of the pirated product
and a decrease in market power for both ﬁrms, since it also implies a lower diﬀerentiation.
To give some intuition about the eﬀect of an increase in the ratio of qualities that can imply a change
in the government’s optimal policy we construct the ﬁgure 3, which shows the social optimum according
to the value of the marginal monitoring cost of piracy and the ratio of qualities. We have assumed that
θ = qi = δ =1 , G =1 /8 and the cost of monitoring is lineal (C (α)=dα), so the marginal monitoring
cost is constant (C0 (α)=d). As can be seen from this ﬁgure, l-outcome is only socially optimal when
the marginal monitoring cost level of piracy is intermediate and the quality ratio is small. However,
ne-outcome (f-outcome) is socially optimal when the marginal monitoring cost of piracy is low (high)
enough, independently of the quality ratio.
5.4 Income and Piracy
We can make another interpretation of θ as a measure of the consumer’s income. Thus, a bigger θ is
associated with a richer consumer. In this case, the utility of a consumer is q − (1/θ)p if he buys a
10These results are the same as those in vertical diﬀerentiation literature, where ﬁrms are said to prefer to diﬀerentiate
their products from those of their competitors to restore some monopolistic power (Shaked and Sutton (1982), Champsaur
and Rochet (1989)).
14product of quality q at price p, and zero if he does not buy any product (see Tirole (1988, p. 96) for more
details).
We wish to analyze the relationship between per capita income and piracy, so, we deﬁne per capita




.L e t E [θ]=θ/2 be the per capita
income and let Rp = Dp/(Di + Dp) be the piracy rate. The piracy rates when the pirate enters as










From (22) and (25), we obtain that the demand of both the incumbent and the pirate depends
positively on per capita income in every outcome, while the piracy rate is independent. Thus, for every
possible outcome k ∈ {f,l,ne,m}, we obtain that a bigger per capita income that does not imply a change
of outcome does not aﬀect the piracy rate and leads to higher demand and proﬁt (both the incumbent
and the pirate), and more eﬀort by the government (∂gk/∂E [θ] > 0 ∀k ∈ {l,0,m}), which means that in
a country with a higher income the government must do a bigger eﬀort to let the pirate become a leader,
to encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of the pirate and to blockade the entry of the pirate,
because the pirate’s revenue is higher.
Moreover, from (23) and (25), we can see that increases in the level of eﬀort by the government that
imply a change in outcome cause a decrease in demand for the pirated product and in the piracy rate. This
conclusion coincides with that obtained in the empirical work by Rodríguez-Andrés (2006). Moreover, if
we take into account that intellectual property receives greater protection in developed economies, which
is supported by the empirical work Marron and Steel (2000), and we assume that this is due to cheaper
monitoring technology,11 we get that high-income countries with cheaper monitoring technology have
lower piracy rates, as in empirical works by Marron and Steel (2000) and Rodríguez-Andrés (2006).
The empirical work of Bezmen and Depken II (2006) obtains a negative relationship between software
piracy and income for various states in the United States. This result is supported by our theoretical
model if the monitoring cost of piracy is diﬀerent between one state and another in the US.
6 Should the incumbent give the pirate the opportunity to be
leader?
So far we have assumed that the pirate is the only one that can decide to when enter in the market, so he
can be the leader on prices. In this section, we extend the model to the case where the incumbent has the
advantage of deciding ﬁrst whether to enter or not. This raises the question of whether the incumbent
gives the pirate the opportunity to be leader.
The extended game is the following. The government announces α and G to maximize social welfare,
and both ﬁrms observe the policy variables. Then the incumbent decides to price the original product
11The cultural factors and the strong institutions, that enforce contracts and protect property, of the developed economies
can do the monitoring technology of piracy cheaper.
15ﬁrst or to wait. If he prices ﬁrst, the pirate observes the price and becomes a follower on prices, so
the game continues like the f-subgame. But if he waits, the pirate has the opportunity to be leader: if
t h ep i r a t ep r i c eﬁrst, the game continues like the l-subgame, but if he waits the game continues like the
f-subgame. Finally, the consumers observe the price of the products and then decide to buy the original
product, the pirated product or neither.
As in proposition 2, the decisions of both the incumbent and the pirate depend on the level of
government spending on avoiding piracy, and the incumbent allows the pirate to be leader on prices,
although for a lower interval of values of g. The market equilibrium is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 In any SPE of the extended game, the hedonic prices given g are as follows: xi = x
f
i
and xp = xf
p if g ∈ [0,g l); xi = xl
i and xp = xl
p if g ∈ [gl,g i); xi = xne
i if g ∈ [gi,g m); xi = xm
i if













∈ (gl,g 0). (26)
The incumbent is indiﬀerent between waiting and acting as leader on prices for any g except on the
intervals [gl,g i) and [gi,g 0).W h e ng ∈ [gl,g i) he prefers to wait so as to allow the pirate to act ﬁrst as
the leader, but when g ∈ [gi,g 0) he prefers to act ﬁrst to avoid the entry of the pirate.
The social welfare of continuation in SPE is:
W =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




p − α(1 − δ)If
p − C (α) if 0 ≤ g<g l,
CSl + πl
i + Il
p − α(1 − δ)Il
p − C (α) if gl ≤ g<g i,
CSne + πne
i − C (α) if gi ≤ g<g m,
CSm + πm
i − C (α) if gm ≤ g
(27)
As in Section 4, we have that the government will choose the maximum penalty G, and social welfare
function (27) is decreasing in α on the intervals [0,g l),[gl,g i),[gi,g m) and [gm,+∞).S o i n o r d e r t o
maximize social welfare the government will choose the minimum monitoring rate that lead to diﬀerent
outcomes, which is α ∈ {αf,α l,α i,α m},w h e r eαi =
qigi
qigi+G. As a result, since g is increasing in α,s o c i a l
welfare is decreasing in g,s ot h ev a l u eo fg in the social maximum is reached in {0,g l,g i,g m},w h i c hi s
the same as in Section 4 except gi. This is because of gi is the value that lead to ne-outcome in this






ii − C (αi),
where CSne
i + πne
ii is the gross social welfare at xne
i for g = gi.S i n c e CSne + πne is decreasing in
g and gi ∈ (gl,g 0) ,w eh a v eCSne
0 + πne
0 <C S ne
i + πne
ii . Therefore, monopoly continues providing the
lowest social welfare and the outcomes f, l and ne continue being candidates to social optimum. This
16implies that the optimal policy is similar to the obtained in Section 4, which only diﬀerence is that
the government chooses gi ∈ (gl,g 0) to reach the outcome where the incumbent deters the pirate from
entering the market. This optimal policy is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 In any SPE, the optimal strategy of the government is:
(a) g =0 ,i fC (αi) > ∆c W
nei
f and Cl > ∆c Wl
f.
(b) g = gl,i fC (αi) >C l + ∆c W
nei
l and Cl < ∆c Wl
f.
(c) g = gi,i fC (αi) < ∆c W
nei




Since the incumbent wishes to retain his monopoly, we now consider the possibility of the incumbent
installing a software protection system (antipiracy system) to prevent his product from being pirated.
Following Banerjee (2003), we assume that the original’s quality is not damaged by the antipiracy system
and the installation cost is ﬁxed at F.
The timing of the new game is as follows: the government decides whether to allow the incumbent to
install the antipiracy system or not. If it denies permission to install it, the game continues as in Section
4. But, if it grants permission it announces α and G that maximize the social welfare. Once both ﬁrms
observe the policy variables, the incumbent decides whether or not to install an antipiracy system. If
he does, he becomes a monopolist. But if he does not the game continues as in Section 4. Finally, the
consumers observe the price of the products and then decide to buy the original product, the pirated
product or neither.
To obtain the SPE we solve the game by backward induction. In the subgame where the govern-
ment does not allow the antipiracy system to be installed, the optimal policy is that we summarized in
proposition 3.
We now solve the subgame where the government allows the system to be installed. If the incumbent
installs it he becomes a monopolist and obtains the proﬁt πm
i − F. But, if he does not install it, the








i (g) be the incumbent’s incentives to install an antipiracy system
w h e nt h ep i r a t ee n t e r s( f-a n dl-outcome) and when the pirate is deterred from entering market (ne-
outcome), respectively. Notice that the incumbent’s incentives to install the antipiracy system decreases








i (g) ∀g ∈ [g0,g m]
As can be seen in the following proposition, the incumbent’s optimal decision about whether the
antipiracy system is installed depends on the government’s policy and on the cost of installation.
17Proposition 7 In any SPE,
(a) If F ∈ [0,πm
i − πne
i0 ], the incumbent installs an antipiracy system if and only if g ∈ [0,g m).








, he installs an antipiracy system if and only if g ∈ [0,g 0).









, he installs an antipiracy system if and only if g ∈ [0,g l).







, he does not install an antipiracy system.
Notice that the incumbent does not install an antipiracy system when g ∈ [gm,+∞) because of the







because of the cost
of installation is too high.
The maximum social welfare in each outcome when the incumbent does not install an antipiracy
system is the same as that obtained in Section 4, whi c hi ss h o w e di n( 1 8 ) ,a n ds o c i a lw e l f a r ew h e nh e
installs it is Wm
ApS = c Wm − F.
Taking into account the incumbent’s optimal decision about whether the antipiracy system is installed,
we obtain the government’s optimal policy when he allows installation, which is showed in the following
proposition. We observe that for a low installation cost the government decides not to monitor and not
to ﬁne piracy, so the incumbent is induced to install an antipiracy system.
Proposition 8 In any SPE, when the government allows installation, we have:
(a) If F ∈ [0,πm
i − πne
i0 ], the govenment decides g =0when F ≤ C (αm), otherwise it decides g = gm.








, the govenment decides g =0when F ≤ Cne − ∆c Wne
m ,o t h e r w i s ei t
decides g = g0.









, the govenment decides g =0when F ≤ min
n
Cne − ∆c Wne




otherwise it decides g = gk,w h e r ek ∈ (l,ne) is the outcome that maximizes social welfare.







, the government’s policy in proposition 3 is held.
Finally, by comparing the government’s optimal policy when it does not allow the incumbent to install
the antipiracy system (proposition 3) with the optimal policy when it does allow the system be installed
(proposition 8), we ﬁnd that the outcome where the incumbent installs an antipiracy system is not an
equilibrium because the social welfare in that outcome is lower than social welfare when the pirate enters
as follower, i.e. allowing the incumbent installs an antipiracy system is ruled out by letting the pirate
enters as a follower, according to the relationship between the gross social welfare in each outcome, which
is showed in (21). Therefore, the equilibriums are the same than in Section 4.
188C o n c l u s i o n s
We analyze the roles of the government and the incumbent in preventing piracy, and the reasons and
incentives why a pirate would want to be a leader in prices. The framework of analysis used is a duopoly
model of vertical product diﬀerentiation with price competition, where both the incumbent and the pirate
are committed to keep their prices.
Our analysis shows that the government will not help the incumbent to become a monopolist, even
if he installs an antipiracy system, because a monopoly provides the lowest social welfare. However, we
obtain that the government, in equilibrium, will decide to let the pirate enters as a follower or as a leader
or to encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the entry of the pirate,
which depends on the monitoring cost of piracy. In particular, he lets the pirate enter as a leader when
the monitoring cost of piracy in this outcome is low enough as regards the gain in gross social welfare and
the monitoring cost at the other outcomes (f-a n dne-outcomes); he encourages the incumbent to deter
the entry of the pirate when the monitoring cost in this outcome is low enough as regards the gain in
gross social welfare and the monitoring cost at the other outcomes, (f-a n dl- o u t c o m e s ) ;a n d ,o t h e r w i s e ,
he lets the pirate enter as a follower, i.e. when the monitoring cost of piracy at l-a n dne-outcomes is
high.
The results in this paper suggest that when the monitoring cost is relatively low and piracy exists,
the government must try hard, but not too much to avoid monopoly, or the incumbent must reduce the
price of the original product to prevent the entry of the pirate, so the threat of piracy is latent. In this
case not just government intervention but also the participation of the incumbent are needed. In short,
eﬀorts by the copyright owner to reduce piracy should focus not only on government enforcement but
also on pricing strategies. This statement is empirically supported by Papadopoulos (2003).
An interesting result obtained in this paper is that the threat of piracy does not lead to lower sales of
the original product, which contrasts with most studies about piracy and some court rulings because they
assume that the copies sold by the pirate are equivalent to units of products that the incumbent does not
sell. This result means that if the purchase of a pirated product at a lower price were not available, this
would not imply the purchase of an original product at a higher price. Therefore, according this paper,
the decrease of the sales of CDs is not a result of piracy, so industry losses from piracy are lower than
claimed by the industry itself, by most studies and by some court rulings.
We ﬁnd that government eﬀort has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on piracy rates and that high-income
countries with cheaper monitoring technology of piracy have lower piracy rates. These results are sup-
ported by empirical studies by Marron and Steel (2000) and Rodríguez-Andrés (2006). We also ﬁnd that
in a country with a higher per capita income the government must do a bigger eﬀort to let the pirate
become a leader, to encourage the incumbent to deter the entry of the pirate and to blockade the entry
of the pirate, because the pirate’s revenue in each outcome is increasing in per capita income.
We assume that both the incumbent and the pirate are in the same economy. If we consider the
19incumbent as a foreign ﬁrm, then the government does not take into account the incumbent’s proﬁt
on social welfare. In this case, ne-outcome, like a monopoly, not maximizes social welfare because
CSm <C S ne <C S f + If
p <C S l + Il
p and C0 (α) > 0. Thus, the government will let the pirate
enter as a follower or as a leader, according to the cost of monitoring piracy. In particular, letting
the pirate becomes a leader is socially optimal when the cost of monitoring piracy at this outcome is
low enough, otherwise letting the pirate enters as a follower is socially optimal. Moreover, it is also
possible that the only social optimum would be that the pirate enters as a follower. This happens when
CSl +( 1− αl (1 − δ))Il
p <C S f + If
p, which is because of the government can reuse little of the revenue
seized from the pirate.
H o w e v e r ,w h e nt h ep i r a t ei saf o r e i g nﬁrm, the government does not take into account him on social
welfare. In this case, the optimal policy obtained when both the incumbent and the pirate belong to the
same economy is held if the marginal monitoring cost of piracy is high enough as regards the maximum
penalty and the revenue used from the revenue seized from the pirate. See Appendix C for more details.
Thus we show that the great variation in piracy rates from one country to another is a consequence
of diﬀerent technologies for monitoring piracy by governments and the nationality of ﬁrms.
Of course, the scope of our results is limited by our assumptions. It would be interesting, for instance,
to extend our analysis to the case of multi-product ﬁrms, network externalities and switching cost.
Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . To maximize (9), we must ﬁrst obtain the possible local maximum restricted
to the intervals I1 =[ 0 ,x ne
i ] and I2 =[ xne
i , ¯ θ].L e t xki and πki be the incumbent’s hedonic price and
proﬁti nt h em a x i m u mo fπc
i(·) on the interval Ik for k =1 ,2, respectively.
First, consider the maximization on I1. Since the monopoly hedonic price is xm




i and x1i = xne










where gm = γ(¯ θ/2), and the maximal value is π1i = φ1(x1i),w h e r eφ1(xi)=qixi(¯ θ−xi) is the monopoly
proﬁt function.
Second, consider the maximization on I2. This case is feasible only when g ≤ ¯ θ
2/4r holds. From (5),
it is easy to see that xi ≥ xBR
p (xi) holds for any xi ∈ [0, ¯ θ]. Therefore, from (2) and (5), maximization







φ2(xi) if xi ≤
2(r−1)
2r−1




¯ θ ≤ xi ≤ ¯ θ,
(29)
where φ2(xi)=qixi(¯ θ − 2r−1




i =( r − 1)¯ θ/(2r − 1) be the the maximum of φ2(·) over [0, ¯ θ]. Therefore x
f
i is the incumbent’s




(2r−1)2.I nt h i sc a s e ,xne
i ≤ 2(r − 1)¯ θ/(2r − 1) holds, and the maximum of πc
i(·) on I2 is reached at
x2i =m a x ( xne
i ,x
f
i ), with a maximum value of π2i = φ2(x2i).A s s u m e
(r−1)¯ θ
2




2(r − 1)¯ θ/(2r − 1) ≤ xne
i . Since (29) becomes ˆ π
c
i(xi)=0 , ∀xi ∈ [xne
i ,¯ θ],t h em a x i m u mo fπc
i(·) on I2 is
r e a c h e da ta n yp o i n ti nI2 with a maximum value equal to π2i =0 .
To summarize the arguments, the maximization of πc
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Note that the parabola φ1 is always above the parabola φ2 on [0, ¯ θ].T h em a x i m u mo fφ1 is reached
at xi = xm
i = ¯ θ/2, whereas the maximum of φ2 is reached at xi = x
f
i .









4r, can easily be obtained. From
the deﬁnition of γ(·) in (6), we have gm =
¯ θ
2
16(r−1) if r ≥ 3/2,a n dgm =
¯ θ
2(2−r)




4(2r−1)2 ≤ gm ≤
¯ θ
2
4r, and we have that
(r−1)¯ θ
2
(2r−1)2 < (resp. >) gm if and only if
1 <r<3/2( resp. 3/2 <r ).
In the rest of the proof, we compare π1i with π2i, by separating the arguments into several cases,
corresponding to diﬀerent intervals for the values of g.
(Case 1) Consider ﬁrst any value g ∈ [0,
(r−1)¯ θ
2









2(2r−1) and, from (8), we have xne
i <x
f
i . By solving the corresponding second-
degree polynomial equation, we can ﬁnd a unique point x0






i .S i n c e π
f
i is the maximum value of φ2(·),w ec a ns e et h a tφ1(xne





i if and only if xne
i is lower (higher) than x0
i. Additionally, from (7) we can show that xne
i is
lower (higher) than x0







,w h i c hi sd e ﬁn e di n( 1 1 ) .




pirate will enter) if g<g l, because then π
f
i >φ 1(xne
i ).W h e ng = gl, it may occur that x∗
i = xne
i (and
the pirate will not enter) or, indiﬀerently, x∗
i = x
f







4(2r−1)2,w eh a v ex∗
i = xne




Note that although the pirate becomes indiﬀerent between entering and not entering when the in-
cumbent prices xne





4(2r−1)2, the incumbent’s optimal hedonic price must be x∗
i = xne
i and the pirate must
not enter. Here, we have xne
i = x
f













. Expressions (30-31) imply π1i = φ1(xne
i ) >
φ2(xne
i )=πi2. In this case, the incumbent will price x∗
i = xne
i and the pirate will not enter in SPE.







. Here expressions (30-31) lead us to
π1i = φ1(xm) and π2i = φ2(xne
i ). Evidently, the incumbent will choose x∗
i = xm










. From (30-31), here we obtain π1i =
φ1(xne
i ) > 0=π2i. Therefore, the incumbent will price x∗
i = xne
i ,a n dt h ep i r a t ew i l ln o te n t e r .










. From (30-31), here we obtain π1i = φ1(xm
i ) > 0=π2i.
Therefore, the incumbent will price x∗
i = xm




4r <g . In this case, it is optimal for the pirate not to enter given any hedonic
price of the incumbent. The incumbent will price x∗
i = xm
i .





i } are gl and gm.
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If we do not include the pirate, the social welfare of continuation in SPE is:
SW =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
CSf + π
f
i + αG + αδIf
p − C (α) if 0 ≤ g<g l,
CSl + πl
i + αG + αδIl
p − C (α) if gl ≤ g<g 0,
CSne + πne
i − C (α) if g0 ≤ g<g m,
CSm + πm
i − C (α) if gm ≤ g
(32)
Given that the social welfare functions (15) and (33) are equal when g ∈ [g0,+∞), we obtain that the
government will choose the minimum g that lead to ne-a n dm-outcomes, which are g0 and gm respectively,
as in Section 4. Moreover, notice that the conditions g ∈ [0,g l) and g ∈ [gl,g 0) are equivalent to the
conditions (α,G) ∈ Zf and (α,G) ∈ Zl respectively, where
Zf =
n
































When the pirate is excluded in social welfare, we have that social welfare positively depends on G.
Thus, the maximum social welfare must be reached at G = G. To maintain the same results that in
Section 4 it is necessary that social welfare will be decreasing in α on the intervals [0,g l) and [gl,g 0),
which is true if G+δIf
p <C 0 (α). Therefore, if G+δIf
p <C 0 (α), the government will choose the minimum
monitoring rate that lead to the diﬀerent outcomes, so the value of g is {0,g l,g 0,g m} when social welfare
is maximum. Therefore, the maximum social welfare is obtained from comparing the following values:
SWf = CSf + π
f
i ,
SWl = CSl + πl
i + αlG + αlδIl




i0 − C (αne),
SWm = CSm + πm
i − C (αm).
(33)
The relationship between the sum of consumer surplus and the incumbent’s proﬁta m o n gd i ﬀerent
outcomes is as follows
CSm + πm
i <C S f + π
f
i <C S l + πl
i <C S ne + πne
i0 (34)
Given C0 (α) > 0 and relationship (34), we deduce that monopoly provides the lowest social welfare
and that the outcomes that maximizes social welfare are f, l or ne, according to the relationship between
gross social welfare and the cost of monitoring piracy like Section 4. Therefore, the optimal policy is
qualitatively similar to that obtained when the pirate is included in social welfare.
Finally, notice that the outcomes where the pirate enters are still possible social optimum, though
they provide less social welfare.
23However, if the condition G+δIf
p <C 0 (α) is not satisﬁed the value of g that maximizes social welfare
on [0,g l) and [gl,g 0) will be one or several values on these intervals according to the value of the marginal
cost of monitoring piracy.
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